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The Volatility Implications of the Chinese Cryptocurrency Ban
By
Keaton Manwaring

Abstract:
In this paper, I examine the effect of the May 18th, 2021 Chinese ban of cryptocurrency transactions
on the overall volatility of the cryptocurrency market. To do this, I analyze, in both univariate and
multivariate settings, range-based volatility in various event windows surrounding the event. I find
clear economic and statistical change in volatility in the five days after the ban. In the ten-day
period after the ban, there is a moderate economic change in volatility. In the forty-day period after
the ban, there is little economic change in volatility. I conclude that the Chinese ban had a clear
short-term impact on the volatility of the cryptocurrency marketplace, but the effects wore off
shortly thereafter.

1. Introduction

Cryptocurrencies (hereafter cryptos) have been in the news a lot lately as policy makers
continue to debate their viability as a currency or if they are simply speculative investment
vehicles. Although cryptos have been mostly used as investment vehicles (Hileman 2017), it is
important to identify the value they might have over other more traditional currencies. Cryptos
have a few advantages. First, the new technology that Bitcoin introduced in the blockchain. The
blockchain is a series of ledgers that creates a system to keep track of payments using a “proof of
work” method to broadcast the correct ledger. This creates the advantage of the ledger being
decentralized, which means the holder of the crypto can mitigate the risk of destabilization in a
country like you would with a regular currency. Second, cryptos have the ability to have an
anonymous ledger, so that the holder can remain anonymous, which can be a real power in today’s
limited privacy environment. Lastly, there is a surge of advancements in the crypto field happening
today. For example, Ethereum has developed a programming language that you can build apps on
their platform and use Ether as the primary currency on the applications. This is just one example
of progress that is taking the blockchain technology and providing further innovations. Perhaps
this is why there are so many people interested in cryptos and why they get so much attention in
the news.
However, this attention ends up being a double edge sword, with high profile figures, like
Elon Musk, being able to affect the price of different cryptos just by sending out a tweet or a news
release. A recent study built a supervised model to test cryptocurrency pricing using news and
social media sentiment, which was able to correctly predict the biggest price fluctuations over a
67-day time period (Lamon, Nielsen, Redondo 2017). This correlation between news, social media
and price – as well as the cryptos’ speculative nature – creates a situation that makes cryptos a

risky investment with extreme fluctuations that can create price instability. Therefore, big news
events involving cryptos can be of intrigue for any investor, or holder, of the cryptocurrency.
The increase in news, size, and intrigue around cryptos has also caught the attention of
world governments. Although China has been the biggest country in mining and trading cryptos
(Hileman 2017), the country has also been the most stringent in terms of regulation. For instance,
China recently banned public coin offerings (Zhang 2020). In addition, on May 18, 2021 China
took an even further step in announcing the ban of cryptocurrency transactions altogether. While
many can speculate on the reasons for the Chinese government to ban cryptocurrencies, the
purpose of this paper is to look into the effects this ban had on the volatility of the overall crypto
market. To measure volatility, I follow Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002) and estimate a rangebased measure of volatility, which has been shown to properly capture important properties of
stochastic volatility. In particular, I calculate range volatility by taking the difference between the
natural log of the daily high price minus the natural log of the daily low price (Alizadeh, Brandt,
and Diebold 2002). I then examine this measure of volatility before and after the Chinese ban in
an attempt to extrapolate whether this ban had any effect on the market as a whole.
To carry out this event study, I examine the prices (in USD) of 372 different
cryptocurrencies, the corresponding volume in the number of coins traded, and the measure of
volatility, discussed earlier. I also control for illiquidity, which is calculated using absolute
continuously compounded return divided by daily dollar volume (Amihud 2002). I examine
volatility around three different event windows: five days, ten days, and forty days before and after
the ban of cryptocurrency transactions in China. This way I can test for the short-, medium-, and
long-term effects of the news of the ban. I also estimate multivariate regressions that control for a
number of important factors that might explain changes in volatility. I also provide a graphical

analysis of volatility during the event days so I can observe an overall trend in order to can infer
any information about the long-term effects of the event.
Results show that for all three event windows, volatility statistically increases. There is
clearly a short-term economic effect from the event as the average five-day post-event volatility is
0.1685 more than the average five-day pre-event volatility. However, the long-term economic
effect is questionable, as the 40-day post-event volatility is .0143 more than the 40-day pre-event
volatility. While the post-minus-pre-period difference is still statistically significant in the longer
window at the .01 significance level, there really does not appear to be much of an economic
increase. When focusing on the multivariate analysis, I observe similar findings as the short-term
economic effect of the event is statistically and economically significant, but the longer-term effect
on overall volatility is too small to draw meaningful conclusions. The results from my analysis
suggests that a country-wide ban on cryptocurrency transactions, like the one in China, has a
dramatic, short-term effect on volatility. This information has practical importance to those using
cryptos as an investment vehicle, or store of value, and to those using cryptos as a currency in a
more traditional sense.
The rest of the paper follows. Section 2 presents a discussion of the data used throughout
the analysis. Section 3 reports the empirical tests and results. Section 4 offers some concluding
remarks.

2. Data Description
The data used in the analysis come from 372 different cryptocurrencies during an 80-day
period (40 days before and 40 days after) surrounding the Chinese ban of crypto transactions on
May 18th, 2021. I obtain daily pricing and volume data from the largest cryptos, like Bitcoin, as

well as smaller coins in order to capture a broad crypto market trend. The data is obtained from
CoinMarketCap. The daily price variable is the exchange rate between each coin and USD.
Volume is the number of coins traded per day. Rvolt is a ranged based volatility, or the natural log
of the daily high price minus the natural log of the daily low price following Alizadeh, Brandt, and
Diebold (2002). Illiq is the absolute continuously compounded return divided by daily dollar
volume following Amihud (2002). After obtaining this information, I clean the data by dropping
any missing data cells and winsorizing at the 1st and 99th percentile levels. I note that winsorizing
the data forces the maximum values, such as price, to be to be lower than expected. My final
sample consists of 29,016 crypto-day observations.
In table 1, we report the summary statistics of the sample. The average price is $69.42 and
the standard deviation is $410.46. The minimum price is $0.00, the maximum $3,587.51 and the
median is $0.52. The price variable is highly right skewed as the median is lower than the mean,
meaning that most of the cryptos exchange at a low price and there are some high outliers including
the maximum, like Bitcoin. For this reason, I take the natural log of this variable in my
multivariable regression analysis. The average of dollar volume is $438,318,185 and the standard
deviation is $1,862,961,214. The minimum volume is $32, the maximum is $14,310,000,000, and
the median is $3,184,751. Again, the volume is right skewed because most coins have little trade
volume and there are the bigger coins have massive trade volume amounts. Again, I take the natural
log of this variable in my multivariable regression analysis to account for this type of skewness.
Rvolt has a mean of 0.1685 and a standard deviation of 0.1390. The minimum Rvolt is 0.0018, the
maximum is 0.9086 and the median is 0.1313. This variable is pretty close to normally distributed
and no adjustments need to be made. The Illiq variables mean is 0.4417, while the standard
deviation 2.9596. The minimum volume is 0.0000, the max is 30.2439 and the median is 0.0001.

This variable is also right skewed, but since there are days with zero illiquidity (the absolute value
of the daily return in the numerator is zero), we are unable to take the natural log of this variable.

3. Empirical Results
3.1. Correlation Matrix
To begin the analysis, I first look at a simple pooled correlation matrix of all the variables
used in the study. Table 2 reports the pooled Pearson correlation coefficients between price,
volume, volatility, and illiquidity. Price and Volume have a correlation coefficient of 0.3728,
which is statistically significant. I expected price and volume to have a positive correlation because
the lower priced coins are usually the less popular coins. Price and Rvolt have a correlation
coefficient of -0.0674, which is also statistically significant. This is expected because as volatility
increases, I expect that to have a negative impact on the price variable. Price and Illiq have a
correlation coefficient of -0.0247 and is statistically significant. The likely reason they have a
negative correlation coefficient is because an illiquid currency has a negative effect on price
because of its’ inefficiencies in trading. Volume and Rvolt have a correlation coefficient of -0.0374,
which is statistically significant. I expect this negative correlation given that the more stable
currencies usually trade more often. Volume and Illiq have a correlation coefficient of 0.2508 and
is statistically significant. This is expected because more volume would suggest that the crypto is
less illiquid. This unexpected result might be caused by the relationship between dollar volume
and price. Rvolt and Illiq has a correlation coefficient of 0.2508 and is statistically significant. This
is likely due to fact that the more volatile the coin, the less liquidity in the crypto.
3.2. Univariate Tests

To dig deeper into the variable of interest, Rvolt, I conduct a univariate analysis around
three different time windows surrounding May 18, 2021 – the Chinese ban date. The results of this
analysis are in Table 3. Here, I estimate the means and medians of crypto volatility during the
periods before and after the event. I then examine the difference of the means and medians using
t-statistics and Wilcoxon sum rank tests. The first event window consists of the five days before
and after the ban. The difference in mean volatility during the pre- and post-event periods is
0.1685, which is statistically significant at the .01 level and has a t-statistic of 31.63. The difference
in median during this same timeframe is 0.1759 and is also statistically significant at the .01 level.
The implications of this result are clear. There seems to be a large short-term effect of the Chinese
ban on the volatility of cryptocurrencies. In economic terms, these results suggest that volatility
approximately doubled in response to the ban.
The question then shifts to whether or not the ban has a lasting impact on the volatility of
cryptos. To test this possibility, I replicate my tests using the ten days before and after the event.
The difference in means during this period is 0.0849, and the difference in medians is 0.0634.
Again, the test statistics suggest that the differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
The results are muted quite a bit when adding only an extra five days to the event window.
However, there is still an economic effect, and in a medium length time window, I can still say
that the ban of crypto transactions in China had an effect on volatility on the crypto market as a
whole. When looking at the 40 days before and after the ban, the difference in means for this event
window is 0.0143, and the difference in the medians is 0.0038. These are also statistically
significant at the .01 level. Although the 40-day time range has statistical significance it has
severely less economic significance. What I can conclude from these univariate tests is that

volatility increased dramatically during the time of the ban, but leveled out quickly after the event
and went back to previous volatility levels.
I provide graphical representation of volatility surrounding the ban in Figure 1. The results
from this simple analysis confirm what I have learned through the univariate tests discussed
previously. This graph shows a huge spike in volatility on the day of the announcement. After the
event, volatility stays unusually high for a few days then appears mean revert. In the second panel
of Figure 1, I plot the price on the y-axis and event days on the x-axis. Price drops on the day of
the event and appears to continue to decrease for the rest of the time period.
3.3. Multivariate Tests
To better understand the effect of the ban on crypto volatility, I conduct a multivariate
analysis, which is reported in Table 4. More specifically, I estimate the following regression
equation on a panel of crypto-day observations:
𝑅𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑁(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑁(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝛽4 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,
where Rvolt is the measure of range- based volatility. Post is an indicator variable equal to one on
days after the announcement of the Chinese ban and zero otherwise. We include as control
variables, the natural log of price and volume as well as Amihud’s (2002) measure of illiquidity.
We have taken the natural log of the price and volume variables to help normalize the distribution
of both of these variables. This regression allows me to test whether the event has any effect on
the volatility of cryptos while controlling for other important factors, such as price, volume, and
illiquidity. To help with possible heteroskedasticity, I report heteroskedastic robust standard errors.
I again look at the three different periods surrounding the ban.
First, I look at the five days before and after the event. The intercept for the regression is
0.064 with a 7.10 t-statistic and a .10 significance level. Post has a 0.1647 coefficient with a 32.49

t-statistic and a .01 significance level. This means that, on average, volatility is 0.1647 greater in
the five days after the event then before the event. So even when controlling for price, volume and
illiquidity, the event still effects the volatility of cryptos in the short term. Regarding the control
variables, the LN(price) variable has a -.0079 coefficient with a corresponding t-statistic of -7.81,
which is statistically significant at the .01 significance level. This coefficient suggests that if we
increase price by one percent we expect volatility to decrease by .0079 units. This variable is not
economically significant and does not give us any real insights. The LN(volume) variable produces
a coefficient of 0.0052 with a t-statistic of 6.95. This result indicates that an increase in volume by
one percent increases volatility by 0.0052 units. Like LN(price), this variable is not economically
significant either and does not provide us with important insights. The Illiq variable has a 0.0084
coefficient and a 7.93 t-statistic, which suggests that Illiq is statistically significant at the .01 level.
This result indicates that a one unit increase in illiquidity has a 0.0084 unit increase in volatility.
The findings for this coefficient is also economically insignificant as well. This model had 3,956
observations and had an adjusted R-squared as 0.2366 suggesting that the model explains 23.66%
of the variation in volatility.
Next, I examine the ten days before and after the Chinese ban to see if controlling for these
variables has any differing effect on volatility in the medium term. The intercept coefficient is
0.1136 and has a t-statistic of 13.44, which is statistically significant at the .01 significance level.
Again, the Post variable has a coefficient of 0.0819 and a t-statistic of 22.67, which is significant
at the .01 significance level. This result suggests that the time after the event has a 0.0819 higher
volatility, on average, when compared to the pre-event period. Again, I find that after controlling
for price, volume and illiquidity, there is a moderate economic effect on the volatility due to the
event. I will not review the coefficients of the control variables here as they had no significant

change when I examined the different time period. This model had 7,554 observations and an
adjusted R-squared of 0.1159.
Given the univariate analysis – conducted in the previous subsection – I next determine
whether controlling for price, volume and illiquidity variables had any change in the post-event
variable in the long-term of forty days before and after the event. The intercept for this model is
0.1657 and has a t-statistic of 39.86. The Post variable has a coefficient of .0083 and has a tstatistic of 4.85 and is statistically significant at the .01 significant level. This result indicates that,
relative to the pre-event window, volatility is .0083 greater after the event, which is not very
economically significant. I find that as the longer the event window is, the less economically
significant the Post variable becomes. This confirms what I learned in the univariate analysis as
the event impacted the volatility in the short term, but as time went on, the volatility returned to
pre-event levels. The intercept follows the opposite trend as we might predict because all the other
variables are very similar. The intercept starts to explain the volatility instead of the post variable,
this simply means that volatility is explained more by a constant as time goes on or another
explanatory variable we have not included in our model. I note that there are 29,016 observations
used in this analysis and the adjusted R-squared is 0.0711. The R-squared has also decreased
significantly which means the model is explaining less when looking longer term.
4. Concluding Remarks
In this study, I examine whether or not the Chinese ban of cryptocurrency transactions
affected the overall volatility of the crypto market in the short-, medium, and long-term. To do
this, I use both univariate and multivariate analyses that capture changes in volatility during the
period immediately surrounding the ban. My findings show that in the five days before and after
the ban, there is a clear economic and statistical impact on crypto volatility. When I increase the

event window to the 10 days before and after the ban, the inferences change slightly. I find that
there is only a moderate economic change in volatility in the medium term. Finally, to examine
the longer-term effects of the ban, I explore the 40 days before and after the event. Here, I find that
the effect on volatility decreases so low that there is little to no economic significance in the longterm. My conclusion is that while the news of the Chinese government banning crypto affected the
stability of prices, the ban did not affect the long-term volatility of the marketplace.
Perhaps future studies might examine the effect of the ban on overall prices. As I show in
Figure 1, the average crypto price decreases dramatically after the event and stays at this decreased
level for at least 40 days. I would say that this requires further attention to see if I can find a causal
relationship between this event and the price of cryptos when China announced the ban. This type
of research might provide evidence of a longer-term price effect even though the change in
volatility is transitory.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
This table displays summary statistics that describe the sample of 372 cryptocurrencies in the 40 days
prior to May 18, 2021 when China announced it would ban cryptocurrency transactions. We obtain daily
pricing and volume data from CoinMarketCap. Price is the exchange rate between the cryptocurrency
and USD. Volume is the number of coins traded in USD. Rvolt is range based volatility of Alizadeh,
Brandt, and Diebold (2002), or the natural log of the daily high price minus the natural log of the daily
low price. Illiq is Amihud (2002) illiquidity, or absolute continuously compounded return divided by
volume (scaled by 10 ).
4

Price
Volume
Rvolt
Illiq

Mean
$69.42
$438,318,185
0.1685
0.4417

Std. Dev.
$410.46
$1,862,961,214
0.1390
2.9596

Min
$0.00
$32
0.0018
0.0000

Median
$0.52
$3,184,751
0.1313
0.0001

Max
$3,587.51
$14,310,000,000
0.9086
30.2439

Table 2. Pooled Correlation Matrix
This table shows the Pearson pooled correlation coefficients between various cryptocurrency measures
in the 40 days prior to May 18, 2021 when China announced it would ban cryptocurrency transactions.
Price is the exchange rate between the cryptocurrency and USD. Volume is the number of coins traded
in USD. Rvolt is range based volatility of Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002), or the natural log of the
daily high price minus the natural log of the daily low price. Illiq is Amihud (2002) illiquidity, or absolute
continuously compounded return divided by volume (scaled by 10 ). P-values are in brackets.
4

Price
Volume
Rvolt
Illiq

Price
1.0000

Volume

0.3728
[<.0001]
-0.0674
[<.0001]
-0.0247
[0.0031]

1.0000
-0.0374
[<.0001]
-0.0351
[<.0001]

Rvolt

Illiq

1.0000
0.2508
[<.0001]

1.0000

Table 3. Volatility of Cryptocurrencies around Chinese Ban – Univariate Analysis
This table displays average daily volatility for 372 cryptocurrencies in various event windows
surrounding May 18, 2021 when China announced it would ban cryptocurrency transactions. Rvolt is
range based volatility of Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002), or the natural log of the daily high price
minus the natural log of the daily low price. T-statistics are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets.
*** and ** represent statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.

Pre

[-5, +5]
Mean
Median
0.1721
0.1389

[-10, +10]
Mean
Median
0.1802
0.1465

[-40, +40]
Mean
Median
0.1685
0.1313

Post

0.3406

0.3148

0.2651

0.2100

0.1829

0.1351

0.1685***
(31.63)

0.1759***
[0.0001]

0.0849***
(22.70)

0.0634***
[0.0001]

0.0143***
(8.18)

0.0038***
[0.0001]

Different

Table 4. Volatility of Cryptocurrencies around Chinese Ban – Multivariate Analysis
This table reports the results from estimating the following regression equation on a sample of cryptodaily observations:
Rvolti,t=α+1Postt+2LN(Pricei,t)+3LN(Volumei,t)+4Illiqt+i,t
where the dependent variable is range-based volatility, Rvolt, or the natural log of the daily high price
minus the natural log of the daily low price. Post is an indicator variable equal to one if the crypto-day
observation is on or after May 18, 2021 when China announced it would ban cryptocurrency transactions;
zero otherwise. Price is the exchange rate between the cryptocurrency and USD. Volume is the number
of coins traded in USD. Illiq is Amihud (2002) illiquidity, or absolute continuously compounded return
divided by volume (scaled by 10 ). T-statistics are in parentheses obtained from robust standard errors.
*** represents statistical significance at the 0.10 level.
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Intercept
Post
LN(Price)
LN(Volume)
Illiq

N
Adj. R

2

[-5, +5]
0.0864***
(7.10)
0.1647***
(32.49)
-0.0079***
(-7.81)
0.0052***
(6.95)
0.0084***
(7.93)

[-10, +10]
0.1136***
(13.44)
0.0819***
(22.67)
-0.0077***
(-10.83)
0.0039***
(7.43)
0.0094***
(10.66)

[-40, +40]
0.1657***
(39.86)
0.0083***
(4.85)
-0.0068***
(-20.21)
-0.0003
(-1.27)
0.0080***
(16.31)

3,956

7,554

29,016

0.2366

0.1159

0.0712

Figure 1. Volatility and Price of Cryptocurrency Market around Chinese Ban
This table plots average range-based volatility and prices across the 372 cryptocurrencies in the months
surrounding May 18, 2021 when China announced it would ban cryptocurrency transactions. Rvolt is
range based volatility of Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002), or the natural log of the daily high price
minus the natural log of the daily low price.

